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Abstract:
Military sociologists have emphasised the importance of primary groups in the military which are 
widely regarded as the fundamental basis of large military institutions. To explain the formation 
and persistence of these primary groups, military sociologists have focused primarily on the 
informal social interactions between soldiers which produce bonds of comradeship. This 
comradeship is the basis of social cohesion. Although sustainable, there is an unfortunate bias in 
the work of military sociologists. They focus almost exclusively on informal rituals which are 
without question important. However, the critical rituals which bind military groups together are 
the formal processes of training. Drawing on ethnographic analysis of the Royal Marines, this 
paper attempts to redress the balance. It examines the drills – above all the communication drills - 
which British soldiers are collectively trained to perform and claims that these constitute the key 




Military institutions depend on a level of social cohesion which is matched in few other social 
groups. In combat, the armed forces are able to sustain themselves only so long individual 
members commit themselves to collective goals even at the cost of personal injury or death. 
Military sociology has sought to explain the social processes which produce this extraordinary 
level of social cohesion. Janowitz and Shil’s famous article on the social cohesion of the German 
forces in the Second World War is among the most important illustration of this attempt to answer 
the problem posed by collective military action.i In that work, Janowitz and Shil’s describe the 
exceptional performance of the Wehrmacht by reference to the strength of small ‘primary groups’. 
For them, primary groups were held together by bonds of very close comradeship. The article was 
a seminal contribution to military sociology. More recently, various other sociologists have 
confirmed Janowitz and Stils’ emphasis on primary groups.ii They have illuminated the way in 
which male soldiers employ informal, exclusive masculine rituals to constitute themselves as 
social groups. The importance of informal social interaction to the creation of social groups 
cannot be underestimated; Weber himself demonstrated the importance of exclusive social 
interaction for the creation of status groups.iii 
However, by emphasising these certainly significant informal practices, many 
sociologists have ignored the formal rituals which soldiers undergo; the intense training regimes 
in which collective drills are inculcated. In his recent discussion of ‘interaction ritual chains’, 
Randall Collins has emphasised the importance of repeated training rituals as a critical method of 
sustaining group identity: ‘“Training” is not simply a matter of learning; it is above all 
establishing identity with the group who carry out their skills collectively’.iv Training is a 
Durkheimian ritual in which the group is periodically re-created. Only through the collective 
practice of training do military groups become cohesive, oriented to shared goals and to the 
communal means of achieving them. Although perhaps less intriguing than masculine initiation 
rituals, training and the adoption of shared professional practices constitute the critical rituals for 
groups of soldiers. It is noticeable that Janowitz and Shils ignored the drills and tactics of the 
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German Wehrmacht. For them, the fear of betraying colleagues was sufficient to explain the 
exceptional performance of the Wehrmacht. Yet, military units are effective insofar as soldiers are 
able to perform collective drills. Informal rituals are certainly important but they are not sufficient 
to explaining the performance of military groups. For instance, many of the masculine practices 
which military sociologists have described among primary groups can be found across many 
other masculine social groups. The transgressive practices which these sociologists note of male 
soldiers can also, for instance, be found among football hooligans in Britain. Yet, while interested 
in violence, a hooligan firm would be completely incapable of conducting itself like a group of 
soldiers. The difference between soldiers and hooligans lies decisively in the training which 
soldiers undergo so that they can perform collective drills. 
Aran’s well-known (but problematic) analysis of parachuting is an early example of 
military sociology which attempts to analyse the collective drills of soldiers themselves. More 
recently, Boer has tried to redress the balance in military sociology, demonstrating the importance 
of operational work-ups and deployments to the performance of fighter squadrons in the Second 
World War, while Kretchnik has shown the importance of training to the effectiveness of 
multinational staffs.v This paper seeks to follow the lead of these contributors and to focus more 
specifically on training and actual military practices. In this way the paper seeks to re-orient 
contemporary military sociology away from informal masculine rituals towards formal training 
rituals. It would be possible to examine a multitude of professional practices in order to do this. 
However, there are certain practices which are especially critical to social cohesion. In his famous 
work on combat, S.L.A. Marshall claimed that during the Second World War, less than one in 
four US infantry soldiers actually fired their weapon at the enemy even if they had the 
opportunity to do so.vi Although Marshall exaggerated his results, he recognised that the modern 
battlefield was an empty space in which the soldier experienced isolation and loneliness.vii In 
order to overcome the emasculating isolation of the battlefield, Marshall proposed that soldiers 
should be taught to communicate with each other in tactical situations. Communication between 
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soldiers would remind soldiers of their collective obligations to each other and affirm to all that 
everyone was still committed to shared goals even in the dangerous environment of the 
battlefield. By communicating on the battlefield, social cohesion – critical to military 
effectiveness - would be maintained.
S.L.A Marshall’s work provides a convenient starting point for the analysis of formal 
training rituals for he prioritises a central practice among soldiers; communication. In order for 
the military to maintain group cohesion, communication between soldiers is critical. It might even 
be argued that communication is the primary drill which soldiers learn since it co-ordinates all 
their individual skills, such as weapon-handling. Since it is only insofar as military units engage 
in co-ordinated action that they are powerful, communication is of paramount importance to 
them. An analysis of some of these communication drills will offset the bias in contemporary 
military sociology towards informal social practices. It will re-focus military sociology towards 
critical formal training rituals in the manner which Boer and Kretchnik suggest. Although any 
military force in the current era could be the focus of analysis, the British armed forces are the 
exclusive object of analysis here. Although they lag behind the United States’ network-centric 
capability and have their own cultural peculiarities, their modes of operation are compatible with 
United States and other NATO forces. Thus, although culturally specific, this ethnography of 
some of the drills of the British forces is intended to illuminate more general procedures. In the 
current era, the British armed forces have developed sophisticated methods of communication. 
Although there are different procedures for different situations, at the tactical level, three kinds of 
communication drills are paramount; orders, signals and commands on contact. These three 
methods of communication currently constitute the essential basis of how the British armed 
forces conduct themselves on operations. They are the critical rituals by which groups of British 
soldiers orient themselves to collective goals.viii 
Orders
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The orders process is the means by which plans (orders) are disseminated from the highest 
commanders down through the military hierarchy to the smallest units. During the Second World 
War, European and American armies began to institutionalise certain methods by which orders 
were given and it has now become an established formal practice in these military organisations. 
Significantly, in the NATO alliance whatever the audience whether a general staff or a ‘section’ of 
eight soldiers, all follow the same NATO orders procedure. The NATO orders process is divided 
into six stages, described as preliminaries, the situation, the mission, the execution, service 
support and, finally, command and signals. The structure of the orders process is logical. In 
preliminaries, the organisation of the orders process itself is arranged. Situation describes the 
relative position of enemy and friendly forces and the weather conditions which will be 
encountered on the mission. The mission is the most important element of any orders procedure 
when the task which is to be carried out is described. Execution involves a detailed description of 
how the mission will be achieved; it describes the scheme of manoeuvre, the plan of assault and 
the withdrawal. Service support describes the assets which will be available to assist the mission, 
while the command and signals section describes the various code words which will be used on 
the mission. The NATO orders process involves several striking elements which are 
sociologically interesting.ix However, for the purposes of illustrating the importance of formal 
training and collective drills, only a single aspect of the orders process will be examined here; the 
use of models in the orders process. The use of models has profound sociological significance as 
they are one of the most important means of communicating orders. Models are, consequently, 
central to instilling and maintaining group cohesion.
Orders are always given employing a model of the objective, as a heuristic tool. At the 
highest level of command, professional model builders are employed to create detailed dioramas 
of the areas in which the missions will be carried out, physically detailing the ground and enemy 
positions. However, even at the lowest section and platoon levels, models will always be 
employed by NATO forces. Here, models are improvised in interesting ways. In the field, NATO 
infantry units deploy from ‘harbour positions’. These positions are located in relatively safe areas 
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away from enemy fire where troops bivouac in a tactical manner. On exercise or on operations, 
commanders will give orders in the harbour position. Consequently, one of the standard 
operational procedures which have to be conducted in a harbour position is the construction of 
models so that the commanders are able to give their orders satisfactorily. Normally two to four 
soldiers will be tasked with the construction of the models near or inside the harbour position. 
Models take a standard form. They consist of two shallow square ‘pits’ arranged next to each 
other with a small corridor of about a metre between them. The small corridor between the model 
pits is essential because the commander will use this gap to walk up and down while giving 
orders, illustrating the plan by physical reference to the models. In Europe, where wood is 
plentiful the ‘model pits’ are usually marked out by branches, gathered or cut down from near the 
harbour position.x Along these branches a series of spaced markers will be inserted to indicate 
scale while a shovel or stick will be employed to point out North. The two model pits are 
respectively referred to as the ‘General Area Model’ and the ‘Objective Area Model’. The 
‘General Area Model’ depicts the area in which the mission will be conducted; it includes 
approach and departure routes and usually depicts the harbour position itself. This model usually 
represents about 2 to 4 square kilometres. The markers on its side indicate 500 meters on the 
model. The ‘Objective Area Model’ refers specifically to the target area; that is, to the objective 
which troops are to reconnoitre or assault. This model is a larger scale model of one section of the 
General Area Model. It is usually on a scale of approximately four times that of the General Area 
Model and the scale markers on its edge normally represent 100 meters. The earth in the model 
pits is contoured into a relief of the stated area, physically representing hills and valleys, spurs 
and re-entrants. In harbour positions, soldiers use surprising creativity in sculpturing the earth 
inside the model pits, improvising with stones, grass, twigs and leaves to signify woods, streams, 
paths and roads. In the British Army, soldiers will also carry with them coloured ribbons and tags 
specifically designated to represent decisive points. 
Once the models are prepared the orders process can proceed. The commander begins by 
describing the models. The commander addresses the General Area Model first, explaining what 
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each of the symbols represent as well as the main features of the model. Road, rivers, hills and 
forests will be identified. The commander repeats the process for the Objective Area Model, 
concentrating on the enemy position – the objective. It is at this point that the rationale behind 
model use becomes clear. It is unlikely that all the soldiers present will have a map and, 
consequently, a model is used simply as a substitute; it ensures that all are familiar with the 
ground on which the mission will be conducted. However, given their resources, the military 
could, of course, potentially provide maps for everyone and the orders process might be 
conducted with soldiers examining their own maps folded on their knees. Yet, even in small 
groups of Special Forces soldiers, where individuals are proficient in map use and it would be 
easy for each to have a map, models are preferred. There are compelling, sociologically 
significant reasons for this preference. On a pragmatic level, it is inefficient and sometimes 
simply impossible to use maps in the tactical situation. Commanders and troops need to be 
sufficiently familiar with the ground on which they must operate so that they can orient 
themselves automatically by reference to certain key features. They must be able identify central 
landmarks as the advance (potentially under fire) or as they lie in tactical concealment. The 
models allow the audience to imagine what they will see as they advance on their target. In each 
case, in the orders process, the commander will emphasise to the troops how these features will 
appear to them on the ground and how the individuals in the platoon should direct themselves in 
the relation to these prominent features. 
The models assist collective action not merely because they depict the ground as the 
troops themselves will see it, however. More importantly, models are used because this ensures 
that there is only a single representation, to which the attention of all is directed. It is significant 
that in creating models, the makers focus precisely upon those distinctive features which the 
platoon will confront on the operation. The model makers are concerned with detail but no attempt 
is made at a universal model which represents every feature realistically. Model makers focus on 
those decisive points which soldiers have been trained to employ as orienting axes and reference 
points in tactical situations. Thus the model-makers and the commander using the model will 
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emphasis wood-lines (which stand out clearly even at night), roads, rivers and pylons which are 
unmistakeable physical features. All are knowingly oriented to decisive symbols which represent 
the tactical situation to all and, simultaneously, everyone recognises that everyone else is so 
oriented. On a recent training exercise with the Royal Marines, this use of physical features on the 
ground, represented on the model, and to which all are collective oriented was clearly 
demonstrated.xi The commander, a Royal Marine major, was giving orders to a group of Young 
Officers for a deliberate attack on an enemy position which would be conducted first during 
daylight and then at night. The enemy position, consisting of a truck and radio tent inside a berm, 
was represented on the Objective Area Model by a large stone which the Young Officers tasked to 
make the model had found locally. Beyond this stone, two sticks were placed which represented 
two large dead trees on the ground. The commander explained the significance of the sticks. The 
two trees – the sticks on the model – stood directly behind the enemy objective and as the two 
assaulting sections organised themselves on the line of departure before the assault and during the 
assault itself, these two trees could be used as reference points. They would orient the Young 
Officers, acting as an axis along which they could advance. In the event, as the Young Officers lay 
in their section positions on the line of departure, the trees were, as instructed, clearly visible. 
During the night attack this was even more the case, where as the commander had mentioned, they 
stood out against the night-sky. The memory of the commander’s description of the ground and 
the stick symbols from the model could at that point be recalled by each member of the troop, 
ensuring appropriate collective action. Each member of the troop would know the location of the 
enemy position, assaulting on this defined axis of advance. The symbol on the model became a 
symbol in reality, co-ordinating collective action in actual time and space. In his work of 
aboriginal religion, Durkheim sought to illustrate the universal process by which human groups 
form. For Durkheim, human groups require intense periods of social interaction in which the 
group gathers and group members re-affirm their allegiance to each other. Durkheim emphasises 
that the existence of human groups is decisively dependent upon understanding. A group exists 
only when members recognise their special relationships to each other and act upon them. Since 
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group depend ultimately on the concept which group members have of themselves,  physical 
symbols or totems, are essential to the process of group formation. They are the tangible and 
physical representation of the group; physical objects symbolise the collective understandings 
which actually constitute the group. As Durkheim notes, ‘without symbols, social sentiments 
could have only a precarious existence’.xii On this Royal Marine training exercise, Durkheim’s 
argument about the centrality of symbols to group cohesion was demonstrated. The model – and 
particularly the two sticks representing the trees - had become a physical totem of the group 
inspiring collective action on the ground and sustaining group coherence. The sticks and, then, the 
trees oriented all group members to a single collective goal; the assault.
The use of distinctive physical features like woods, roads and rivers, represented 
symbolically on models by stones, ribbons or twigs, is reinforced by the use of certain verbal 
symbols which invest these features which additional meaning. At the end of the orders process, in 
the command and signals section, the commander will give nick-numbers and nicknames to key 
features on the ground.xiii While precise geographic points – usually denoting rendezvous points - 
are given nick-numbers (eg. ‘Nick 11’ or ‘Nick 12’), large and distinctive features are given 
nicknames. Thus, in a training lecture on the orders process which described a hypothetical raid on 
an inland force by heliborne troop of Royal Marines, two prominent hills were nicknamed ‘South 
Kidney’ and ‘North Kidney’ since they were curved and kidney-like in shape.xiv Nicknames 
distinguish and individualise anonymous features, drawing the collective attention of the group to 
them. The group is communally oriented to a now distinctive point of which all are automatically 
aware. On operations, the same procedure is adopted but nicknames are often selected which have 
dense social connotations and, therefore, greater ability to co-ordinate collective action. In his plan 
for the assault of Mount Harriet in the final phase of the Falklands Conflict in 1982, Lieutenant-
Colonel Nick Vaux, the Commanding Officer (CO) of 42 Commando Royal Marines, called the 
three summits of his objective, Tara, Zoya and Katrina.xv This followed 42 Commando tradition 
where the unit’s objectives are named after the daughters of the CO. It is noticeable that on recent 
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operations in Iraq, 42 Commando once again used the CO’s daughters’ names for their objectives. 
On the same operation in Iraq, C Company of 40 Commando nicknamed three of their objectives 
on the Al Faw Peninsula, Plymouth, Taunton and Arbroath after the three towns in Britain at 
which 40, 42 and 45 Commandos are based. All members of 40 Commando would have been 
intimately familiar with these places, many having served with these units. The objective names, 
consequently, evoked dense social connotations for the members of 40 Commando. Similarly, 42 
Commando’s tradition of using the CO’s daughter’s names not only individualises the nicknames 
(and, therefore, the features themselves) – especially among other senior officers who might know 
the daughters after whom the objectives are named – but links with 42 Commando’s collective 
memory. Every member of 42 Commando, past and present, knows that its military objectives are 
always named after the CO’s daughters. In this way, although the objectives – and their nicknames 
- change, 42 Commando’s past military actions are efficiently linked to the mission immediately at 
hand. Nicknames weight potentially meaningless and indistinct features with social significance. 
They become symbols on the ground, invested with an identity which suggests particular kinds of 
collective actions to individual soldiers. Their power can be enhanced by using terms which 
already have meaning to the collective to whom the orders are addressed. The nickname will not 
simply communicate the significance of a feature on this particular mission but will automatically 
remind soldiers of the general standards which they are supposed to achieve in relation to their 
forebears. In the case of the Royal Marines, these symbolic names direct them not just to the 
collective goals of their immediate group but to their Commando unit and the Royal Marines as a 
whole. This is a powerful means of ensuring appropriate social action. In this way, apparently 
lifeless features like hill-tops, forests or wadis are vivified and invested with intense meaning by 
this social group, encouraging social cohesion. Through the use of nicknames, military models are 
able to operate like those totems which affirm group solidarity among aboriginal clans.xvi The 
models – and the features which they signify -  come to represent the group itself, inspiring 
feelings of solidarity and demanding collective action from individual members.
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By the use of models as dense totemic symbols, the orders process is intended to 
minimise the opportunity for individual and idiosyncratic interpretations. However, the 
commander cannot be sure that individuals have understood the collective goal. It is possible that 
individuals may have mis-understood their roles. In order to affirm understanding, the orders 
process involves a final procedure which concludes each of the six sections. Having 
communicated the situation, the mission, the execution and so forth, the commander will pause 
and ask, ‘Are there any questions?’. Sometimes there are none but any which are posed will be 
answered.xvii When it is clear that there are no further queries, the commander will then ask: ‘If 
there are no further questions, I have some for you?’. At this point, he will direct questions to 
specified individuals under his command. The persons selected will usually be sub-commanders 
and the questions will be deliberately designed to ensure that these sub-commanders have grasped 
the essentials of the plan. The commander could ask what the nick-numbers or nicknames for the 
mission are, he might ask a question about the scheme of manoeuvre (where certain sub-units are 
meant to be when) or he might ask about ‘actions on procedures’; that is the actions which the 
group should follow on encountering unforeseen circumstances such as media, obstacles or the 
enemy. In this way, the commander affirms that his orders have been understood but in answering 
questions, sub-commanders effectively repeat the plan to the rest of the group. The commander’s 
questions provide a forum in which the plan is once again re-emphasised and all demonstrate that 
they have understood what it involves. There is a double dialectic at work which unifies the 
group. Every member of the group knows what to do and what others will do, but this is 
buttressed by the fact that everyone knows that everyone else understands what everyone is 
doing. The orders process has developed into an elaborate social process in which military units 
commit themselves to decisive forms of collective action through the use of verbal and visual 
symbols in a ritualised activity which represents appropriate conduct on the mission itself. The 
orders process is a critical method by which the isolation and dis-orientation of the battlefield can 
be overcome. Even in the confusion of battle, the ritualistically inculcated symbols of the orders 
process are intended to commit individual soldiers to collective goals. The success of British 
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soldiers in recent conflicts is primarily a result of the rigorous and lengthy training process in 
which recruits learn and re-learn how to receive and eventually to give orders. They become 
collectively sensitive to the way orders are given and what they imply for group members. In this 
way, the orders process constitutes a sophisticated system of communication by means of which 
social cohesion is sustained among British soldiers even in the extreme conditions of combat. It is 
here that the explanation of the performance of British – and any other – forces lie; not primarily 
in the way soldiers might drink together.
Signals
Clausewitz famously stated that ‘everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is very 
difficult’.xviii  Moving a troop of Royal Marines from their harbour position to the form-up point 
after the conclusion of orders demonstrated the point. In civilian circumstances, the approach to 
the form-up point was a gentle stroll, through some woods, across a valley and into another wood. 
However, the mere fact that thirty marines had to be manoeuvred tactically to the form-up point 
multiplied the difficulties. As S.L.A. Marshall noted, the advent of mechanised warfare in the 20th 
century has demanded concealment and dispersal. In particular, it has become vital for troops 
approaching their objectives to move silently. This creates significant problems of coordination 
and it is compounded by the fact that manoeuvres often take place at night. If a platoon could be 
co-ordinated as it moved forward by shouts and calls between its members, the problems of 
collective movement would be significantly reduced. Yet, this is precisely what cannot occur in a 
modern tactical situation. Consequently, military forces have developed a simple but extensive 
system of hand-signals which are intended to co-ordinate action without breaking silence. On a 
line of advance, these hand-signals will be passed up and down the line of advance, normally 
from first to last.xix As with orders, the British armed forces have developed methods of giving 
hand-signals which minimises the possibility of individual deviation. These methods were 
demonstrated by the Royal Marine Young Officer troop.xx 
As the Royal Marine Young Officers advanced through to the first, second and final 
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rendezvous points, the signal for these points was given. The Young Officers stood in turn in the 
exactly the same position and drew an imaginary circle at their feet, through the middle of which 
they pointed decisively to a particular spot on the ground. It was emphasised to the Royal Marine 
Young Officers that they had to point to exactly the same spot as they had themselves been 
shown. As it moved through the wood, the troop of some thirty Young Officers was dispersed 
over 200 yards. If each Young Officer were careless about indicating each rendezvous point so 
that they did not make this gesture on the spot shown but back a little way from it, where they 
were standing when shown the gesture, the rendezvous point could actually move as it was 
passed along the troop. The troop would not be collectively oriented to one site but would be 
individually oriented to potentially thirty sites, each some ten or twenty yards from each other. 
The rendezvous point might be 200 yards apart for first and last man. Rendezvous points are used 
as rescue points should the mission go wrong. In the orders process, commanders will instruct 
soldiers who become lost or detached due to their own errors or to enemy action to retreat back 
through rendezvous system waiting for a designated period to meet with the rest of the group. If 
there is a diversity of the rendezvous points, detached soldiers will never be able to re-join their 
colleagues. At night, there needs only be a small discrepancy about rendezvous points for troops 
to miss each other or mistake each other for enemy with potentially disastrous consequences. The 
military have developed a series of hand-signals to co-ordinate action in tactical situations and 
they have developed methods of giving these hand-signals so that the potential for individual mis-
interpretation and deviance is minimised. Hand-signals promote social cohesion. Although 
nothing is certain in war, these hand-signals are intended to give advancing troops the best 
possible chance of arriving as planned on their line of departure.
Commands on Contact 
As Marshall emphasised, communication is particularly critical to the military once they come 
under fire. In combat, military units will be effective only insofar as their members are committed 
to collective action but it is precisely under fire, that the breakdown of social cohesion is most 
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likely. Under the stress and confusion of enemy fire, individuals are most likely to resort to 
deviant action which will lead to the demise of the group and, ultimately, the individual. Military 
forces have developed procedures to sustain social cohesion, even though these actions demanded 
of individuals often run against the instincts of self-preservation.  Above all, communication 
between soldiers under fire is emphasised and developed in training. Even in a deliberate attack, 
when a military force will be oriented by the symbols already established in the orders process, 
communication is essential. Soldiers will need to be informed how the plan is actually proceeding 
so that they can be confident of pursuing orders in the manner instructed. In addition, local 
circumstances are likely to differ somewhat to those described in orders. The ground is likely to 
offer more or less cover than anticipated in orders; enemy reactions are likely to be stronger or 
weaker than initially predicted by orders. Consequently, in even the most carefully planned 
assaults, communication will be essential to sustain collective action. 
In live firing section attacks, the importance of communication in response to ‘contact’ 
(coming under effective enemy fire) was repeatedly stressed to the Royal Marine Young Officers. 
Communication drills are recognised as a central part of training as they are critical to operational 
conduct.xxi A section is divided into two four-man ‘fire-teams’, known as Charlie and Delta 
teams.xxii Charlie and Delta teams are matching units – armed with the same or similar weapons. 
The section operates according the standard infantry practice of fire and manoeuvre. In any 
tactical confrontation with the enemy, the section will employ its fire-power in order to 
manoeuvre. Fire-power is employed to suppress the enemy – to physically force them into cover 
– so that the section can move; either forwards into an assault or backwards into a withdrawal. 
The Charlie and Delta teams constitute mutually supporting fire-teams. While one provides 
suppressive fire, the other manoeuvres. Each fire-team is further broken down into pairs, which 
also mutually support one another, so that if one soldier is manoeuvring, his partner in the fire-
team lays down covering fire. Following principles of fire and manoeuvre, in a section attack, the 
whole section will return fire to suppress the enemy, find cover and then, while Charlie team lays 
down further covering fire, Delta team will move forward to assault the position. In a live section 
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attack, following contact with the enemy, a Royal Marine Young Officer section took cover under 
a bank by a road with the enemy position (indicated by electronically controlled targets) some 
two hundred metres in front of them. At this point, the section commander instructed Charlie 
team to move forward and leftwards to a better fire position. Once the Charlie team was in 
position, the section commander led Delta onto the enemy position by means of a ditch which ran 
diagonally from the road up to the position. During these exercises, one of the training sergeants 
emphasised the utility of what he called ‘pro words’ (prompt words). Instead of giving verbose 
instructions, the section commander could direct the Charlie team leader with the simple words: 
‘Final position’. Instantly, Charlie team would know their role. In the command, ‘final position’, 
a series of messages about what Delta team were about to do and what the Charlie team should do 
to support them were contained. Charlie team would know that it should stay in that position 
suppressing the enemy with fire until Delta team had assaulted the objective. The ‘pro word’ 
acted in the same way that the symbols had in the orders process. They signified a complex series 
of actions in condensed form. Indeed, for this sergeant, an entire section attack could be co-
ordinated by the use of three ‘pro words’; ‘final position’, ‘point of fire’ (referring to the position 
which two members of Delta team adopted to support the final assault by the section commander 
and another soldier) and ‘break down’ (which referred to the clearing of the enemy position by 
the section commander and his assistant). Like the models in the orders process, decisive words 
of command are critical to the effectiveness of a military force when it comes into contact with 
the enemy. Because they are used repeatedly in training, commands develop dense significations, 
tying soldiers together and directing them towards collective goals.xxiii 
In Iraq in 2003, the role of commands in promoting social cohesion was explicitly 
demonstrated. On the night of 19-20 March, Charlie Company and the Manoeuvre Support 
Company of 40 Commando seized an oil facility (the Manifold Metering Station) on the Al-Faw 
Peninsula in one of the first actions of the conflict. Although in orders, little enemy opposition 
was expected, in the event, an enemy of company strength (about 100 soldiers) was stationed at 
the objective and the Royal Marines came under fire immediately on landing. In order to counter 
14
the enemy, Corporal Peter Wattsxxiv launched a section assault on the major concentration of the 
enemy in a position just beyond the Manifold Metering Station’s compound. He conducted a 
‘text-book’ section assault using the formally established words of command (the ‘pro words’), 
with which the marines had become intimately familiar during training. Although only Watts’ 
section was involved in the assault, the other members of Charlie Company and the Manoeuvre 
Support Group heard his words of command. As the Manoeuvre Support Group noted afterwards, 
the use of the familiar command words by Corporal Watts inspired confidence in them all.xxv His 
commands demonstrated that even in this hostile and dangerous environment, the Royal Marines 
adhered to the collective drills established in training.xxvi The collective pattern of behaviour was 
re-emphasised to all the individuals Royal Marines present. Even in this frightening situation, all 
were reminded that the members of the unit were adhering to familiar collective drills. In a later 
action on 30 March 2003, when the Manoeuvre Support Group was ambushed as they advanced 
on Abu Al Khasib, south-east of Basra, members of the group again emphasised the importance 
of commands and collective drills. On coming under fire, they instinctively fell back into fire and 
manoeuvre drills, co-ordinated with the appropriate commands. Members of the group described 
how they had constantly and automatically communicated to each other, informing each other of 
the enemy’s position, their own movements as they sought cover, their ammunition state and 
whether they had stoppages. Maintaining social cohesion, the Manoeuvre Support Group was 
able to suppress the enemy with impressively heavy fire and extract itself from the ambush. 
The commands which the British armed force use fulfil the requirement for a clear voice 
on the battlefield for which Marshall calledxxvii; these commands promote social cohesion. In 
highly trained teams, communication becomes extremely fast and members respond 
automatically to minimal signals to which they have become used. One Royal Marine officer, on 
the Young Officer training team, who had served in the British Special Forces emphasised that in 
these units, members became so familiar with each other, that they knew instinctively what others 
would do in response to contact. Nevertheless, although to an outsider, communication seems to 
become irrelevant to well-drilled groups, the reality is that these groups operate so slickly because 
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their communications are very efficient. Communication becomes denser not superfluous 
precisely because these groups have spent days and weeks building up collective drills with each 
other in training. During this time, shared goals and the collective means of attaining them 
become manifestly established to all. Special Forces are successful not because the individuals in 
them are military geniuses or heroes but because they train harder and more realistically than 
other military groups and, therefore, have the best collective drills. Individuals in the Special 
Forces will adhere to collective patterns of behaviour at extreme moments when other military 
groups will lose their cohesion and fragment. Significantly, the same officer, who had served in 
the Special Forces, stressed the importance of communication to the Royal Marine Young 
Officers, whom he was training. On watching a failed contact drill, he rebuked the Young Officers 
for the lack of clear commands between them which ensured that their collective drills were 
poor.xxviii Individual actions were not co-ordinated and, consequently, the quantity of suppressive 
fire was inadequate.
In tactical situations, verbal instructions are important but soldiers are taught to employ 
another symbol to co-ordinate their actions; fire itself. Enemy and friendly fire is specifically 
employed as a means of communicating what collective actions are appropriate. Thus, on a 
planned advance to contact or deliberate attack, the sound of friendly fire will stimulate a series 
of responses from soldiers in the group. They will seek cover and begin to return fire in support 
of their colleagues. Enemy and friendly fire is also decisive in indicating when a section should 
attack. The first rule of infantry tactics is to win the fire-fight. In the first exchanges, the 
assaulting force needs to suppress the enemy so that they are fixed in their position and are unable 
to lay down effective fire. Once the enemy is fixed, the assault can be mounted. Up to a point it is 
self-evident that manoeuvre should not be attempted until the enemy is suppressed; soldiers will 
be un-inclined to leave cover and advance if they can see, hear and, indeed, feel enemy rounds 
impacting close to them. It is obvious they will be killed. As fire becomes more sporadic and they 
are less likely to be killed, individual soldiers will be more inclined to move. However, soldiers 
do not respond individually to the suppression of enemy fire. If they did, a diversity of actions 
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might be taken as soldiers felt more inclined to move. Soldiers might rationally remove 
themselves from the battlefield as enemy fire became more sporadic or they might charge forward 
randomly in heroic individual assaults. In fact, soldiers are not trained to respond individually to 
enemy fire. On the contrary, enemy fire is used as a co-ordinating symbol, in response to which 
soldiers are taught to assault the enemy position collectively, firing and manoeuvring in support 
of each other. A specific collective response is tied to the symbol of enemy fire. Lack of enemy 
fire unifies the group into a single collective action: the assault. It is a symbol of social cohesion. 
Friendly fire is used in the same way. At the level of the section, the Charlie and Delta teams will 
respectively move only when they hear the distinctive noise of their comrades’ covering fire to 
which soldiers become intimately accustomed after years of training and operations. Especially in 
the noise and confusion of battle, the report of friendly weapons becomes as important a unifying 
force for soldiers today as the drum and bugle were two hundred years ago. In the British Army, 
the distinctive crack of SA-80xxix is an unmistakable sound and British forces have maximised the 
social usefulness of this sound when they come into contact; they have made a virtue out of a 
necessity. The sound of gunfire has become a co-ordinating signal for British soldiers. They do, in 
fact, march to the sound of gun-fire.
Interestingly, gunfire does not always mean the same thing. In a different tactical 
situation, the same gunfire –a burst from an SA-80, for instance – can demand quite different 
actions from soldiers. In small patrols, SA-80 fire does not signal the start of a section attack but, 
on the contrary, a ‘contact drill’ which involves a tactical withdrawal from the enemy with the use 
of suppressive fire. Friendly fire constitutes a vital co-ordinating instruction in these contact drills 
but the actions which it promotes are quite different. The point-man of a patrol normally sets his 
weapon on automatic because a burst of automatic fire ensures that a greater volume of 
suppressing fire is generated very quickly. This has an important deterrent effect on the enemy. 
Although the fire is likely to be inaccurate, it will force the enemy to take cover. Yet, there is an 
important social function which the point man’s automatic fire serves. It is an unmistakeably 
signal which initiates contact drills with a clarity which no verbal order could ever match. The 
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burst of automatic fire demands a decisive response from the rest of the patrol. All instantly 
understand what has happened even if they can see nothing; they are in contact. A burst of 
friendly fire drives them quickly to fire positions and into their withdrawal drills. Not only does it 
demand specific actions from each member of the patrol but by listening to the group’s gunfire, 
everyone knows how everyone else is reacting to contact. Interestingly in different contexts, 
military groups determine that exactly the same signal – a burst of SA-80-fire – stimulates quite 
different reactions. When advancing to contact or on a deliberate attack, the burst of friendly fire 
is a sign that Charlie and Delta team should follow assault drills. On a patrol, however, the signal 
denotes a quite different set of procedures; it signifies contact drills. Gunfire has become an 
important signal in the British Army, denoting a variety of collective drills.
The British armed forces have established certain physical and verbal symbols by means 
of which group cohesion is maintained even under the stress of combat. In order for these 
symbols to communicate collective action, extensive training is essential. Although informal 
interaction is certainly not irrelevant to the performance of military units, groups of soldiers will 
recognise collective symbols and respond to them only after lengthy periods of training. It is 
interesting to note that while 40 Commando’s Manoeuvre Support Group maintained its social 
cohesion in combat by recourse to collective drills and their supporting words of commands, the 
Group was not unified in informal rituals. Immediately before the operation, there had been a 
large brawl between the machine-gun and anti-tank sections of the Manoeuvre Support Group on 
HMS Ocean. The Group’s unified professional conduct in Iraq cannot be explained by reference 
to the prior social unity of the Group. The informal interactions on board ship denoted a serious 
social divide within the Group. During the ambush, however, anti-tankers and machine-gunners 
mutually assisted each other in line with the drills they had been trained to perform. Group 
members described how anti-tankers delivered ammunition to the machine-guns, while machine-
gunners operated the Milan missile systems when the need arose, although Milans are anti-tank 
weapons. The priority of training is illustrated by other military forces. The Wehrmacht, for 
instance, was successful because its doctrine was sound and its training methods – rigorous to the 
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point of brutality – ensured that every soldier was able to adhere to the collective drills specified 
by doctrine.xxx As German soldiers were unified into these collective drills, extremely close bonds 
of friendship developed which promoted excellent conduct but it is vital to recognise that in 
military units, collective drill is primary. Strong primary groups are not necessarily ones in which 
soldiers are deeply fond of each other, though they often are. In reality, the bonds of friendship 
grow out of military proficiency. Soldiers who successfully adhere to collective drills and in that 
way promote the group are honored and looked upon with affection. Bad soldiers, however well-
liked they might have been at the beginning of training, are shamed and eventually excluded from 
the group. British paratroopers on the Falkland Islands demonstrated the priority of professional 
practice in creating bonds of comradeship. In his account of that conflict, a lance-corporal in the 
Support Company of the 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, described how his friendship 
with a private in his section was undermined by the latter’s professional incompetence. Bramley 
described how the private had stood up to put on waterproof trousers during a battle, thereby 
compromising the section’s position: ‘I felt embarrassed by him. Twice he had acted like a week-
one recruit. Things were never to be the same between us’.xxxi Crucially, honour and shame is 
attached to collective, professional practices. A successful army, such as the Wehrmacht, will 
consist of a myriad of such practically proficient groups which interlock into a larger whole.
Conclusion
Military sociologists like, Janowitz, Moskos, Arkin and Winslow argue that social cohesion in the 
military is maintained by the existence of primary groups. These groups arise through informal, 
social interactions in which bonds of comradeship are forged; in these groups, soldiers are 
motivated by a desire for honour and a fear of shame in front of their peers. Consequently, 
individuals commit themselves to group goals even if personal sacrifice is involved. The analysis 
of Janowitz et al. is illuminating; informal rituals producing bonds of friendship are important. It 
is undoubtedly true that military units cohere only when the soldiers in them are personally 
known to each other. In the Royal Marines, the informal social process of swapping stories 
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(known as ‘dits’) is widely recognised to be important in sustaining professional practices. 
Moreover, during fieldwork among the Royal Marines, the importance of informal masculine 
rituals became evident. Between formal training evolutions, training sergeants would engage in 
‘banter’ with the Young Officers. The sergeants would discuss and joke about the Young Officers’ 
recent sexual exploits; it was noticeable that the joking was not reciprocated. Denoting the status 
hierarchy, the Young Officers could not mock the sergeants. Formal professional performance is 
supported by a series of informal practices which the training team also sought to inculcate. 
Nevertheless, the training described here only affirmed the priority of formal rituals for the 
creation of coherent groups. Although many of the Royal Marine Young Officers might accord 
with the standards of masculinity described in these friendly and humorous discussions with 
sergeants, only those individuals who attained the required professional standards would be able 
to serve in the Royal Marines, whatever status they had in the informal sphere. Military 
sociologists have generally paid too much attention to subsidiary rituals while ignoring the 
critical process of training. In the military, strong primary groups are the product of intense 
training regimes; collective practices are inculcated primarily in these formal rituals. The power 
of primary groups in the military rests on their ability to adhere to these collective drills even 
under intense pressure. In every case, communication is critical to social cohesion and to the 
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